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This paper analyzes the decision-making process 
in monetary policy in Spain in the context of 
the economic and monetary integration of the 
European Economic Community. 
The first section describes this process from an 
institutional perspective responding to some of 
the issues to be considered at the BIS autumn 
meeting of central bank economists. 
The second and third sections go more deeply 
into the design of monetary policy and the 
problems involved in its implementation in view 
of the important changes experienced in recent 
years, particularly: the entry of the peseta 
into the EMS and the firm commitment to Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). 
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1. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN MONETARY POLICY IN 
SPAIN 
The L aw 
B anco de Espana, 
article 3, the 
regulating the Governing B odies of the 
of 2 1st June 1980, institutes, in its 
B anco de Espana " will carry out the 
monetary policy, in both its domestic and international 
realms, in accordance with the general objectives set by 
th e Government, implementing it in the manner it considers 
most appropriate for achieving the desired aims, 
particularly that of safeguarding the value of the 
currency". The B anco de Espan a will also report and advise 
the Government on th ese matters. 
of its 
State 
E ach year the Government sets the overall lines 
economic policy 
Budget which 
and defines its 
it presents to 
priori ties in 
Parliament 
the 
for 
discussion and approval during the last quarter of the 
year. At the same time: the B anco de Espan a prepares the 
monetary programme for th e following year, taking as its 
basic reference point th e macroeconomic setting of th e 
budget, and submits to the Government the appropiate 
report. 
Estimates made by government of growth of gross 
domestic product and th e targets set for th e rate of 
inflation define the limits of expansion for the nominal 
expendi ture to be financed th rough creation of liquidity 
and constitute the starting point for the monetary 
programme. 
Moreover, budget estimates of public sector 
borrowing requirements, and th e manner in which these are 
to be financed, together with B anco de Espana estimates of 
movements on capital account and the performance of the 
domestic financial markets, allow to h armonize the main 
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financing flows between the v arious sectors of the economy 
in the framework of a monetary budget and the effects of 
the outlined monetary and fiscal policies on the financial 
condi tions of the economy, the interest rates and the 
exchange rate. 
A ll the 
-which includes, 
work done for 
in addition to 
the annual programming 
the monetary budget, 
simulations with money and credit demand functions, 
analysis of possible changes in the v elocity of 
circulation, the setting of scenarios in the international 
context (interest rates, exchange rates, trade flows and 
external capital mov ements) - results in the setting of 
monetary targets in terms of a quantity of money 
aggregate. The work of monetary programming carried out 
and their conclusions are submitted for study and approval 
to the B ank's Executiv e B oard. 
Beginning this year, the setting of monetary 
targets is also subject to a process of consultation with 
other EEC member countries, according to procedures 
adopted by the Committee of Gov ernors . 
A fter setting 
liquidity for the 
continuously monitored. 
the references for 
year as a whole, 
F or this purpose, 
the growth of 
targets are 
every ten days, 
internal proj ections on trends in monetary aggregates are 
made, as well as a monthly " Monetary Targets Document" is 
prepared in which the mos t recent behaviour of monetary 
aggregates and financial markets is analyzed, particularly 
the money and foreign exchange markets; the nature of the 
deviations from money supply targets are studied; the most 
recent av ailable information on the real sector of the 
economy is assessed; and new data on the international 
economy is taken into consideration. Finally, 
recommendations are made with respect to the character of 
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monetary policy; the conflicts which could arise between 
the domestic and international realms of monetary policy 
are considered; the direction B anco de Espana interest 
rate policy should follow is indicated; and references are 
set for the growth of q uantity of money for the following 
month. 
This document is submitted for study and approval 
to the Monetary P olicy Committee formed by the Governor, 
Deputy Governor, the Directors General of the B ank and the 
Heads of the Department of Operations, F oreing Operations, 
Monetary and F inancial Studies and E conomic and Short-run 
Studies. 
The body concerned with the short-run management 
of monetary policy is the Operations Committee which meets 
early every morning to define the day's intervention in 
money markets and if necessary in the foreign exchange 
market. The Committee is formed by the Governor, Deputy 
Governor, the Directors General of B ank ing R egulation, 
Operations, International and R esearch, as well as the 
Head of Operations who acts as secretary. Decisions tak en 
in the Operations C ommittee are submitted to the B ank's 
Executive B oard, ' which meets every Tuesday and Friday. 
E xcept in the case of unforeseen events, the line of 
action of the Operations C ommittee will be in the context 
of the recommendations made by the monthly meeting of the 
Monetary P olicy Committee. 
The meeting held by the Operations Committee the 
first day of each ten-day period is of special importance. 
It sets a maximum band' for interest-rate fluctuation for 
overnight interbank deposits; it takes decisions on the 
regular ten-day auction of B anco de Espana certificates 
-which is the instrument for injecting most of the 
liquidity required by the institutions for the cash 
reserve ratio during the 
of three-month Treasury 
marginal interest rates. 
The Operations 
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ten-day 
B ills, 
period- and the auction 
setting the related 
Commi ttee settles the normal 
problems arising from liquidity management each day and, 
according to the situation in the money and foreign 
exchange markets, determines the level of intervention 
rates for open-market operations, situating the interbank 
rate somewhere within the fluctuation band fixed for the 
ten-day period. This Committee also considers 
intramarginal interventions which eventually have to be 
made in the foreign exchange market. 
In the monetary policy decision-making process, 
coordination of the movement of interest rates between the 
B anco de E spana and the 
The periods when this 
Treasury is of special importance. 
connection has been insufficient 
have led to unstable short-run situations in the behaviour 
of the public debt markets and difficulties in the 
implementation of monetary policy. Since 1983, a stable 
channel between Treasury and the B anco de Espana for 
harmonizing these decisions on interest rates has been 
established through the Committee for Settling A uctions of 
Public Securities. This Committee consists of three 
members from the Ministry of E conomy the Director 
G eneral of the Treasury, Subdirector General of Government 
Securities and the Controller General of this D irectorate 
- and three members from the B anco de Espana -the Deputy 
Governor, the D irector General of Operations and the Head 
of the Department of Operations. This committee meets 
prior to the settlement of each fortnightly auction of 
Treasury B ills and before the monthly auction of Treasury 
B onds. The final decision on the interest rate for these 
sales rests with the Treasury . 
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The increasing spanish integration in the 
european financial mark ets and the necessity to harmoniz e 
the outlines of monetary control in the process of 
economic and monetary unification within the He make it 
necessary to omit the mechanisms by which the financing of 
public deficit has been interfering in the implementation 
of monetary policy and banking activity. In this sense, 
two important steps hav e been taken during 1990. 
On the one hand, the high level of the reserve 
ratio during the last years -between 17 and 19, 5 %-, that 
has been motivated by the strong borrowing req uirements of 
the Treasury, has been reduced down to S%. To avoid the 
monetary control problems that a reduction of such 
magnitude could cause, B anco de E spana debt, eq ualling the 
v olume of released liq uidity, has been settped in the 
financial institutions. These securities will be redeemed 
between 1993 and 2 000 according to a fixed timetable. A t  
the same time, compulsory public debt inv estment ratio to 
which financial institutions have been subject will be 
completely eliminated at the end of 1992, following a 
q uarterly timetable of increasing reduction. 
On the other hand, the State B udget for 1990 
establishes a limit of the public borrowing from the B anco 
de Espana, so that it should be null at the end of each 
year. 
Within the institutional framework outlined in 
this section, the decison making process of spanish 
monetary policy has been increasingly conditioned in the 
last few years by the international integration of the 
spanish financial markets, and specially by the ent"y of 
the peseta in the EMS exchange mechanism, within the 
economic and monetary process in the E EC .  This new 
dimension of monetary policy in Spain constitutes the 
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fundamental reference point of discussion on the different 
aspects of monetary control that are taken up in the 
following sections. 
2. EXTERNAL FACTORS CONDITIONING 
DECISIONS BEFORE THE ENTRY IN THE EMS 
MONETARY POLICY 
The tasks that Spanish monetary policy has had to 
deal with in recent years haue been strongly conditioned 
by the momentum of conuergence with leuels of economic 
stability and of income in the central countries of the 
EMS, and with a speeding up of the process of european 
economic and monetary unification. The decision-mak ing 
process is also increasingly influenced by international 
trends towards greater interdependence of national markets 
and intensification of capital mouements. 
The effort to reduce inflation differentials with 
the other members of the EMS and to curb the balance of 
payments deficit, in the context of a uery dynamic 
economy, caused frequent friction, during the second half 
of the eighties, between domestic and external targets and 
between the maintenance of monetary discipline and 
stability in the financial markets. These conflicts haue 
reduced the effectiueness and credibility of monetary 
control based on following up targets for a particular 
definition of money. 
The combination of policies applied in Spain in 
the last few years has relied to a uery large extent on 
monetary control for the aggregate demand management. 
Giuen the strong growth recently experienced by the 
Spanish economy, subject to the pressure of high growth in 
priuate spending, and in uiew of the absence of a 
sufficiently austere fiscal policy, monetary policy has 
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had to maintain a marked res trictive tone a nd, as a 
cons equence, rates of interes t have been k ept at high 
levels . 
This high return on as s ets valued in pesetas has 
created wide interes t rate differentials with foreign 
rates and cons tituted a permanent s timulus to the entry of 
capital. This s ituation has been aggravated b y  
r 
expectations of peseta s ta bility or even a ppreciation. The 
proces s has occurred during a period of growing 
internationalization of Spanis h financial mark ets a nd of a 
trend towards reducing exchange controls , which has 
cons iderably increas ed the s ens itivity of the pes eta on 
exchange markets to movements in domestic interes t rates . 
The flow of funds looking for s hort-term gains has been 
s uperimposed on the inflow of more permanent capital, 
a s s ociated with growing expectations of the return offered 
by the Spa nish economy a s  it becomes part of a wider 
market with greater economic s ta bility. 
However, in a context of relatively high 
inflation rate, financial flows have tended to concentrate 
on s hort-term mark ets and have been channelled mainly 
through the banking s ys tem, cons tituting a n  importa nt 
factor of disturbance in the proces s of harmonizing 
domestic a nd foreign realms of monetary policy (see 
Ariz tegui and FernAndez de Lis, 1989) . 
In thes e circumstances, s trict res pect for 
monetary targets would mean, in the la s t  yea rs ,  a rise in 
levels a nd variability of interes t rates a nd, with growing 
mobility of capital, a s trong tendency for the pes eta to 
appreciate. A monetary policy of this nature would have 
exercised a res trictive influence on domestic demand with 
effects on internal compos ition clearly harmful to the 
medium term growth and the increa s ing integration of 
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E uropean mark ets, a s  its res trictive impact would be 
concentrated on gros s capital formation a nd exports. In 
addition, persis tent rigidity in the labour market gave 
rise to fears tha t a deflationary strategy based 
principally on a ppreciation of the exchange rate could 
have facilitated the maintenance of rates of growth of 
domestic costs incompa tible with long-run convergence with 
inflation rates prevailing in the rest of the system, a s ,  
in these conditions, the favourable impact of the exchange 
rate on prices would have been absorbed b y  a n  increa s e  in 
wages, without being transferred to the underlying core of 
domestic inflation. 
For this rea s on, s ince 1 986 the moneta ry 
a uthorities have tried to contain the trend towards 
appreciation of the pes eta within moderate margins , 
intervening in the exchange mark ets and occa s ionally 
ha ving recourse to adminis trative controls on the entry of 
capital in order to res trict appreciation of the exchange 
rate to levels compa tible with maintaining growth of the 
monetary and credit aggregates a t  rates coherent with the 
ob jectives of domestic stability. 
B efore 1 986, the exchange rate indicator followed 
up b y  the B a nco de E s pana was a pes eta nominal excha nge 
rate index vis-a-vis the currencies of the developed 
countries, weighed b y  the volumen of trade with Spain. 
However, with the exception of very s pecific periods, the 
beha vior of this index was not a reaction mecha nism of the 
economic authorities . When Spain joined the E EC, a t  the 
b eginning of 1986, the B a nco de E s pana s ta rted following 
up a peseta nominal exchange rate index vis -a-vis the E EC 
countries , except Greece a nd Portugal. The behaviour of 
this index has b een increa s ingly a s umming importance in 
the decision mak ing proces s of monetary policy and in the 
interventions in the exchange mark ets . Several rea s ons 
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related with the way of operating the. Banco de 
this mark et a nd the form in which the EMS 
work ing, with the Deuts ch-mark (OM) a s  k ey 
fostered the s panis h exchange rate policy to 
Espana in 
has been 
currency, 
ta k e  the 
german currency a s  a n  es s ential reference. So, in a formal 
way, s ince 1988 a nd until the· entry of the pes eta in the 
EMS in J une 1989, decisions a bout the exchange rate were 
ruled by the behaviour of the nominal pes eta-OM exchange 
rate. 
In periods of s tr ong upward pres s ure on the rate 
of the peseta, the initial rea ction of the monetary 
authorities has been to inter vene in the exchange markets 
to a void a ra pi d s hift in the ra te. On occa s ions , s pecific 
interventions have been s ufficient to normalize the 
exchange market. However, a t  other times , the s iz e  of the 
intervention by the Banco de E s pana has reached very .high 
volumes , a s  can be
. 
s een in Chart 1; this has appreciably 
increa s ed variability a nd s hifts in the centra l reser'ves 
and enormously hindered the complete s teriliz a tion of 
thes e movements on domestic ma rk ets . 
In s ome s itua tions , the Banco de E s pana has 
favoured s hort-run a dj us tment s in i ntere s t rates on the 
domes tic money markets to relieve tensions in the currency 
mark et. In fact, in certain periods the level of interes t 
rates has been the result of the s ea r ch for a compromise 
s olution to the divergent r equirements of the domestic a nd 
external a s pects of monetar y  control. 
However, not even with recour s e  to exchange 
control mea s ures was it pos s ible to a void the a ppearance 
of conflicts compelling the a uthorities to choose between 
trying to maintain control of liquidity, and cons equent 
a cceptance of a n  appreciation of the exchange rate above 
the level des ired, or to accept a certain overflow of 
monetary targets in order to avoid exces s ive upward 
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pressure on the peseta . 
period, 
prompted 
These problems worsened during the 1987-89 
when the strong growth of the Spanish economy 
a deterioration in the ba sic bala nces which drew 
it away from the path of convergence with the EMS 
countries (Chart 2 shows some indicators of this trend) . 
In this situation of growing difficulties, a variety of 
factors revealed the unsusta inab ility of the strategy of 
moneta ry control followed up to then: 
1) A succession of phases in which priority over 
control of monetary a ggregates gave way to others wi th 
greater emphasis on exchange rate sta b ility, together with 
difficulties in interpretation of monetary aggrega tes, 
reduced the credibility a nd the stabilizing efficiency of 
moneta ry policy. 
2 )  The prospect of complete deregulation of 
capita l movements a nd full integration of the Spanish 
economy with E uropea n financial services mark ets prevented 
continued use of exchange control measures a s  a valid 
instrument for dealing with conflicts between monetary 
targets and exchange rate stability. 
3) The deepening of the commercial and financial 
relations with the European economies conferred growing 
important on exchange rate stab ility. F ull participation 
b y  Spain in the Europea n Single Market involves abandoning 
the use of the exchange rate a s  a n  tool for dealing with 
problems of lack of efficiency or lack of discipline a nd 
the a doption of new rules of behaviour aimed a t  modera ting 
nomina l growth in domestic costs as the ba sis for 
maintaining the external competitiveness of the economy. 
-15 -
4) F inally, the increas ing interrelation of 
financial and monetary markets prevented recourse to 
monetary control s trategies involving s udden and frequent 
changes in interes t rates . These s trategies , as well as 
being incompatible with exchange rate s tability, are 
ineffective and lack credibility in highly integrated 
financial markets in which the increas es of the cos t in 
domes tic financing are s trongly influenced by an abundant 
availability of external financial resources . 
3. CHANGES IN SPANISH MONETARY POLICY ON JOINING THE EMS 
The Spanis h authorities believed that entry into 
the EMS and full acceptance of a procces s towards a fixed 
exchange rate, with closer multilateral coordination of 
economic policies , cons tituted the mos t appropriate 
res pons e to the los s of effectivenes s  and credibility 
experienced b y  monetary policy in recent years, after a 
long period in which control of monetary aggregates had 
played a 
inflationary 
the eighties 
very effective part 
pres s ures , es pecially 
(s ee Chart 3) . 
in 
in 
correcting s trong 
the firs t half of 
Membership of the exchange mechanis m of the 
E uropean Monetary System, decision taken b y  the Spanis h 
Government in June 1989 on the eve of the Madrid s ummit, 
was an attempt to attain the dis cipline and credibility 
which derive from exchange s tability. The announcement of 
a commitment to reduce the flexibility of the exchange 
rate is a s timulus for making decis ions taken b y  economic 
agents compatible with a reduction in price growth to 
levels s imilar to thos e at the centre of the System and, 
at the s ame time, allows the reputation for 
anti-inflationary s trategy of the central b anks of the 
countries with greater tradition of s tability to be s hared 
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among the other members . Both effec ts were s pec ially 
nec es s ary in the s ituation of the Spanis h ec onomy in 1989, 
when, after a number of years of s trong pres s ure from 
domes tic demand, c lear s ymptoms of overheating were 
threatening to s et off 
and when following up 
s trong expec tations of 
targets bas ed on the 
inflation, 
growth of 
monetary aggregate did not c reate c onfidenc e nor provide 
s uffic ient reliability,  given the deviations oc c urring 
(s ee Malo de Molina, 1990) . 
The s etting of margins to the fluc tuations of the 
exc hange rate als o permitted to limit the expec tations for 
a revaluation of the pes eta, thus breaking the vicious 
c irc le, fed by the s pec ulative c apital inflows , whic h had 
lead to a permanent upward trend in the exc hange rate, not 
fully jus tified by the c ompetitivenes s of the Spanis h 
ec onomy nor by its c apacity to attract s table foreign 
investments , des pite the latter being very important. 
The trend of the Spanis h ec onomy s inc e joining 
the EMS reflects a s trengthening of anti-inflationary 
s trategy and a more s table environment for the 
expec tations , formation of ec onomic agents . This was what 
had been expected to res ult from the decis ion, des pite the 
fact that it oc c urred in a partic ularly delicate 
s ituation, due to the pers is tence of the s trong growth in 
domestic demand, a res urgenc e of inflation and a rapid 
tendenc y to deterioration in the c urrent acc ount deficit. 
Sinc e 
c hanneled the 
then, 
growth 
the 
path 
polic ies implemented have 
of nominal s pending in the 
ec onomy towards more moderate rates , c ompatible with 
c orrecting the 
applic ation of 
imbalanc es , and the c onflic ts between the 
the res tric tive demand policies and the 
desire to avoid a prolonged artific ial apprec iation of the 
exc hange rate have been k ept within manageable limits . The 
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peseta has mov ed in the upper part of the fluctua tion band 
of t he exchange mechanism and the occasions when it has 
a pproached the maximum a ppreciation limit hav e  been 
corrected by minor interventions in the excha nge markets; 
t hese have not had their former expansionary effect s  on 
domestic liquidity, �nd it has not been necessary t o  rela x 
domestic interest rates, contrary t o  the requirements of 
domestic stability (see Economic Bulletin of the Banco de 
Espa na, J une 1990) . 
Howev er, t hese results were a chieved using direct 
mec hani sms to res t ric t priva te sec tor borrowing and lhe 
continuance of some of the excha ng e control s whi ch 
restrict foreig n capital inflows. The a na lysis of lhe 
reasons for the temporary use of t hese heterodox 
instruments for monetary control is of g reat interest for 
clarifying the outstanding problems of Spanish economic 
policy in articulatiTIg its a nti-infla t ionary credibilily 
within the EMS, a s  well as for studying the 
characteristics of the decision-making process in the 
formula tion of monetary policy, in a situation where 
commitments sev erely restrict possibilities of changes in 
the excha nge rate. 
These reasons are based on t he Ii nks between t he 
excha nge rate and monetary a g g rega t es. ·In fact, lhe 
effects of discipline and a n  a nt i-inflationary reputation, 
which can be derived from closer links with the currencies 
of a n  a rea of g reater stability, can only occur if 
excha nge rate stability is perceiv ed by the economic 
a g ents a s  sustainable in the medium run, and t his, in 
turn, is only possible if g rowth in liquidity is 
compatible 
preva iling 
stabi] ity. 
economies, 
in the short run 
infla tion 
In this 
rate 
sense. 
including up to a 
wi t h  converg ence wi lh t he 
in the area of exchange 
the experi ence 
point some events 
of many 
in the 
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Spanish economy in the 1986-89 period, s how that a 
commitment to exchange rate s ta bility does not, by itself, 
prouide mecha nis m of s ufficient dis cipline; cons equently, 
monetary a nd credit a ggregates continue to play a 
primordial role in the credibility of the ins truments of 
economic s tability. 
If, under couer of the tranquility which exchange 
rate s ta bility prouides a nd of the doubts s urrounding the 
interpretation of the monetary aggrega tes , the a uthorities 
allow a n  exces s iue growth of liquidity, in relation to the 
dyna mis m of expenditure a nd not to s imple financial 
mouements , it will end up by creating imbalances whi-ch in 
the medium run will erode price s ta bility and hence the 
exchange rate. 
When Spain agreed to abide by the rules of the 
EMS, the monetary a nd credit aggregates were growing a t  
rates certainly incompatible with conuergence of the 
Spanis h inflation rate with that of the more s table 
countries , whateuer the margin of uncertainty a ttributed 
to the s ignificance of the growth in monetary and credit 
aggrega tes . 
Simple confidence in the dis ciplinary effects of 
the new exchange s trategy, which would haue tolerated a n  
exces s iue growth of liquidity i n  the economy and of 
priuate s ector borrowing, would haue exacerbated the 
imbalances and eroded, in the medium run, the pos s ibility 
of meeting exchange commitments . In thes e circums tances , 
it was neces s a ry to curb quick ly the expa ns iue momentum of 
the monetary and credit aggregates without recurring to 
new increa s es in the leuel of interest rates which could 
haue conflicted with the limit impos ed on appreciation of 
the peseta by the fluctuation bands in the excha nge 
mecha nism. B oth thes e factors created, in opinion of the 
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authorities , an exceptional s ituation jus tifying recours e 
to emergency meas ures bas ed on temporary res trictions on 
credit to business and families ; to be effective this 
meas ure required the maintenance, als o temporally, of 
certain exchange controls to mak e the pos s ibility of 
foreig n borrowing by the pri·v ate s ector more expensive, 
mainly by the imposition of a compuls ory non-earning 
deposit. With this temporary parenthesis in the usual 
techniques 
direct the 
to apply 
s trengthen 
of monetary control, an attempt was made to 
g rowth of liquidity, while obtaining more time 
other policies , particularly 
the mechanis ms for s tability 
fis cal, to 
within the 
res trictions impos ed by the exchang e dis cipline. 
Generally, this s trateg y has allowed re-direction 
of the g rowth of the monetary and credi t agg reg ates , and 
in las t ins tance of nominal s pending its elf, towards a 
path coherent with the containment of inflation and an 
improvement in the current account deficit. This 
s atis factory result, which has not been exempt from 
di ffi cuI ties and cos ts , could permit a s peedy return to 
monetary control bas ed on the management of interes t rates 
and the lifting of the credit res trictions at the end of 
the year, after they have had the des ired effect and as 
over time their effectivenes s is reduced by a proces s of 
dis intermediation. 
Thus , at the end of this exceptional period of 
credit res triction, Spanis h monetary policy can return to 
dealing with the difficulties for combining containment of 
the monetary agg reg ates with exchang e rate s tability. To 
g et a us eful focus on thes e pos s ible difficulties the 
following three as pects mus t be cons idered: 
1 )  The mutual compatibility of monetary and 
fiscal policy . 
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2) The role of the monetary targets with limited 
exchange rate fluctuations. 
3) The setting end meeting of money suply targets. 
4) Short-run manipulation of interest rates and 
criteria for monetary intervention. 
3. 1 The mutual compatibility of monetary and fiscal 
policy 
The achievement of an appropriate combination of 
the instruments of monetary and fiscal policy has great 
importance for maintaining the growth of monetary 
aggregates within a path coherent with the inflation 
target and exchange commitments. When the dilemma between 
the stability of the exchange rate and control of monetary 
aggregates persistently occurs, it shows that the global 
tone of economic policy is not sufficient to induce 
convergence of inflation rates, and this problem cannot be 
resolved by monetary policy alone. 
For this reason, the most divergent EEC countries 
have to make a significant effort to meet the inflation 
rates of the· more stable countries in the system, while 
accepting to reduce margins for the exchange rate 
modifications, that is narrower fluctuation bands and 
realignments as something exceptional. This implies they 
must give a greater role to fiscal policies in the task of 
macroeconomic regulation. This strategy means that the 
countries with the most divergent economies in the EMS and 
the EEC will have to adopt more austere fiscal policies. 
This objective faces a number of difficulties which could 
reduce the effectiveness and the credibility of domestic 
monetary policy and stand in the way of the process of 
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cons truction of the EMU. 
During the next few years , the mos t divergent 
countries , Spain among them, will hav e to apply tighter 
policies aimed at s tability and s upported bas ically by 
fis cal meas ures , after fixed exchange rates and 
deregulation of capital mov ements eliminate the present 
narrow margin for differentiation of monetary policies . 
This means that the credibility of an 
anti-inflationary monetary policy depends on its link with 
the other components of economic policy. The effects of 
containing price expectations , which can be expected from 
exchange rate s tability and from rigourous monetary 
implementation, could be nullified by inadequate 
defini tion of budgetary policy. Once the economic agents 
are aware of the res trictions under which monetary policy 
operates in a s ys tem of fixed exchange rates , the impact 
of monetary targets on price expectations is conditioned 
by the action of the other ins truments of economic policy, 
particularly budgetary. In Spain, in the las t few years , 
the markets have attributed growing importance to the 
definition of fiscal policy when anticipating the effects 
and effectiv enes s of a monetary policy announced to the 
public, and the authorities , for their part, have 
attempted to as s ign a greater role to fis cal policy in the 
tas k of s tabilization. With the imminent dis appearance of 
credit res trictions both factors will increas e in 
importance. 
From 
effectivenes s 
this 
of 
pers pectiv e,  
this economic 
the credibility 
policy outline 
and 
is 
vulnerable to the difficulties which could arise in aiming 
budgetary policy in the right direction. In fact, the 
characteris tics of the decis ion-making proces s in fis cal 
policy and the lack of flexibility in adjusting its 
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influence on economic activity in response to changing 
circumstances limit its potential use as an instrument for 
short-run stabilization, and make its use based on 
criteria of convergence and stability in the medium term 
more advisable. For this reason, the limits to the 
autonomy of monetary policy arising from the context of 
exchange rate discipline combined with the incapacity of 
fiscal policy for short-run action can generate occasions 
of instability which affect the credibility of this set of 
policies, and hence of monetary policy targets and 
decisions. 
These occasions can be more serious if fiscal 
policy lacks the room for manoeuvre sufficient to take on 
the medium-run stabilizing role required of it. Some of 
the countries with greatest problems of convergence inside 
the EEC are also countries implicated in a process of 
reducing income level differentials with the more advanced 
countries. In these cases, fiscal policy may find 
limitations on its room for manoeuvre as an instrument for 
stabilization. 
These problems also have important repercussions 
for the EMU. The gradual process set out in the Delors 
R eport involves, in the first phase, increasing 
coordination Gf domestic economic policies, followed later 
by multilateral supervision, in order to avoid 
undisciplined behaviour which could erode the stability of 
the whole area and to reinforce stimulus for convergence. 
An important part of this will be to coordinate the 
monetary policies of the participating countries by using 
a set of homogeneous economic indicators in which monetary 
aggregates will have to play a primary role, particularly 
in the larger economies, in line with the preliminary work 
done by the Monetary P olicy Subcommittee of the E E C 
Committee of Governors. 
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However, it is not possible to analyz e the 
compatibility of national monetary policies with the 
objectives of price stability and parities in the EMS 
while respecting the margins for action in monetary 
policy, without formulating an opinion on the character of 
domestic fiscal policies in relation to each country's 
different requirements for convergence. All of which 
raises new issues in the process of creating the EMU which 
have not as yet been sufficiently considered. 
3 . 2  The role of monetary targets in the c'ontext of 
limited exchange-rate fluctuations 
The insufficiency of exchange rate stability to 
provide the necessary anchor confers great significance on 
monetary and credit aggregates. Following up targets for 
growth in liquidity must serve as a reference to avoid, as 
already pointed out, expansionary policies which, in the 
short-run do not appear to be inconsistent with currency 
stability, can lead to the blocking up of serious 
imbalances leading 
(see Fernandez de 
to 
Lis, 
occasions of exchange instability 
1989) . 
monetary 
targets 
policy continues to 
For this reason, Spanish 
be based on following up 
nominal 
for aggregates having stable relationships with 
expenditure ( see the annex detailing their 
selection strategy) . The importance given to monetary 
aggrega tes wi 11 be greater whi Ie condi tions exi s t whi c h 
counsel maintenance of a wide fluctuation band (±6%) and 
while capital movements have not been fully deregulated. 
Nevertheless, exchange commitments exclude any 
rigid implementation of quantitative targets. F or assuring 
the compatibility of monetary control with the limited 
margin for exchange rate fluctuation, it must be managed 
with important doses of flexibility in its approach to 
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targets , and priority attention mus t be given to the 
behaviour of interes t rates and their desired effect on 
movements in the foreign exchange market. 
In this context, the emphasis 
following monetary targets ha·s to vary 
different time horiz onts . In the s hort 
to be given to 
according to the 
run, the orderly 
movement of interes t rates , in cons onance with 
requirements for s tability on financial and foreign 
exchange markets , s hould be given priority over meeting 
quantitative targets ; above all, becaus e the s ignificance 
of pos s ible deviations is s urrounded by s uch uncertainty 
in the s hort run and becaus e an exces s of activis m in the 
management of interes t rates is not compatible with 
exchange rate s tability and leads to increas ed uncertainty 
in financial markets , reducing the effectivenes s of the 
s ignals monetary policy is attempting to make to the 
economic agents . 
Thus , the targets must be approached with a 
longer-term pers pective ( between s ix and twelve months ) ,  
unles s the available information and the expenditure 
trends reveal a incompatible juncture with medium-term 
s tability targets . During this period, an as s es s ment has 
to made of the deviations caused by financial movements 
which could affect the informative content of the 
aggregates and als o of the information available on the 
final variables . When pers is tent deviations are obs erved, 
not attributable to phenomena of a s trictly financial 
nature, an adjus tment to the tone of monetary policy is 
made through interes t rates , provided that the limits of 
exchange rate variation allow it. In the oppos ite cas e 
where departure from monetary targets cannot be corrected 
by monetary policies , but where the behaviour of the 
aggregates provides a s ignal that a combination of 
inadequate policies is being us ed, other ins truments of 
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economi c policy are needed. In this res pect, the credi t 
counterparts 01' the growth 01' the monetary aggregates , 
parti cularly the Foreign one, provi des potentially 
v aluable i ndications 01' pos s i ble i ncons i s tenci es i n  
links between the components 01' economic policy. 
In s ynthes i s ,  
q uanti tative monetary 
the announcement and Following 
targets , although s ubject 
the 
01' 
to 
uncertainty due to uns table relationships between monetary 
aggregates and the final v ari ables and from limi tations on 
monetary control resulting From the commi tments to 
exchange rate s tabili ty, continue to play an i mportant 
part i n  s ecuri ng an economic policy cons i s tent with the 
objecti ve of s tability. 
3.3 The setting a n d  meeti ng 01' money s upply targets 
The s etting and meeti ng 01' q uantitative targets 
have been adapted during the last years few to the new 
envi ronment for monetary policy, i n  which not only the 
exchange rate s tabili ty commitments foster a more Flexible 
s hort-run control of the money s upply but also 
deregulation and financial i nnovation proces s es point i n  
the s ame direction. 
The Banco de Es pana has been s etting targets i n  
terms of a broad monetary aggregate s i nce 1973 ( s ee Rojo 
and P lIrez , 1977) . Unti l 1983 the vari able us ed was M3. 
After 1984, the growth targets of the money s upply began 
to be calculated i n  terms of a wi der defi nition of 
li q ui di ty :  ALP (li q ui d  as s ets held by the publi c) . This 
aggregate encompas s e s ,  i n  addi tion to all the bank 
li abi lities i n  M3, a group of financial as s ets which, due 
to thei r characteri stics 01' li q ui di ty and return, are 
cons i dered as very clos e s ubs titutes for bank depos i t s .  
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Among these assets a re ,  because of their q ua ntitative 
importance, t he short -term financing inst rume nts issue d by 
the State held in priv a t e  sector portfolios, whe ther as a 
result of outright purchase s or " re po" operations with the 
fina ncial inst itut ions (I). 
During t he e a rly years of se t ting money supply 
targets, t he y  were used as internal references and were 
not published. Since 1978, the targets have be e n  published 
and a nnounce d prior to the beginning of their period of 
operation. There is a first a nnoucme nt of t he targets 
during the Sta t e  Budge t prese ntation to P a rtiament. Later, 
in t he first issue of. the year of t he Ba nco de Espana 
Economic Bulle tin, a detailed a na lysis of the mone tary 
targe ts set for the year, as well as t he assumptions on 
which the y  were based, is carried out . 
The targe t s  are, in principle , a pplica ble for the 
whole calendar year. However, · on some occasions it has 
be e n  nece ssary to make changes be fore the e nd of this 
period whe n substa ntial changes in the ma croeconomic 
indica tors used t o  support the mone tary programme have 
occurre d or there have be e n  very severe disturbances in 
the financial marke ts. U nder t he se circumst ances, the 
Banco de Espana has some times opted to re define formally 
the targets a nd a nnounce ne w ones, a nd, more recently, by 
communica ting its willingness to 
departures from the original targe t s. 
tolerate certain 
The ALP targets a re formula t e d  in te rms of a 
growt h band for the whole year. The width of the band has 
varied ove r the years be twe e n  three and four pe rce ntage 
points. Table 1 shows the bands of targets set since 1978 
and re a l  change s in the related mone tary aggregates. 
The growth target set for a ye ar e ssentially 
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results in an operational path of constant growth for the 
whole period, Chart 4 shows the monitoring of the ALP 
targets, expressed in terms of accumulated growth compared 
with the December balance of the preceding year, I t  can be 
seen that since 1988, together with the band of constant 
growth, two parabolas are superimposed which converge in 
December at the maximum and minimum limits of the band . 
These broader references for evaluating the targets allows 
more flexible follow-up during the year, particularly in 
the early months, when revisions of the monetary seri es 
are usually more frequent; growth rates on the December 
balance are subject, by definition, to more erratic 
behaviour; and, sometimes, certain difficulties arise for 
linking the new range of targets to the trend of the 
monetary aggregate, 
The movement of ALP is affected by continuous 
di sturbances of varyi ng nature and intensity, which means 
that the course of the aggregate during the year does not 
generally coincide with the programmed path. - F luctuations 
in the level of economic activity, short-run instability 
of demand for money, movements i n  the autonomous factors 
relati ng to creation of liq uidity and the difficulti es in 
estimating with accuracy the seasonal pattern of the 
monetary series are among the factors causing i rregular 
behaviour i n  the rate of growth of ALP. These phenomena 
have meant that the Banco de Espana has had to accept 
temporary deviations from medium-term targets, even when 
these have been strictly pursued . 
When fairly serious deviati ons occur, the Banco 
de E spana sets guidelines for growth of the aggregate of 
very short-term operation which serve as a link with the 
annual range of reference, These short-term targets are 
expressed in terms of an intermonth rate of change applied 
to a seasonally-adj usted series of ALP. Changes in the 
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monthly targets set during recent years shows a tendency 
towards a flexibility in short-run control of the money 
supply, reflected in the programming of processes of 
convergence, or, more precisely, speeds of return of the 
growth rate of the aggregate towards the annual range of 
reference, more gradual and smoother. This fact has meant 
accepting that deviations from the range take place over 
longer periods of time (see EscrivA and Peiialosa, 1989) . 
In fact, the monthly targets for ALP set since 1988 have 
generally followed a rule of base drift. This technique 
for setting targets involves accepting the deviation 
recorded up to that time with respect to the annual range 
and setting a rate of expansion for the aggregate in the 
following month equal to the target for the annual growth 
rate. 
It is a strategy which accommodates the 
fluctuations observed in the quantity of money in the 
short run and, by having stable guidelines for 
targets, 
could be 
avoids frequent reconsideration 
influenced by temporary factors. 
of 
setting the 
them which 
These tendencies show flexibility in the role 
played by the intermediate target of monetary policy. 
Though ALP continues to provide very relevant information 
on the growth of the money supply, the deviations recorded 
with respect to the reference ranges do not constitute a 
completely automatic mechanism for reaction by the 
monetary authorities, as it was the usual behaviour at the 
beginning of the eighties. On the contrary, the process 
for taking decisions on monetary policy has become more 
complex. The rates of growth of ALP are assessed on the 
basis of observations of their behaviour over long periods 
of time and are complemented with information coming from 
other monetary and real aggregates. Although ALP continues 
to be the main indicator, additional information is also 
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used from changes in smaller monetary aggregates, from 
credi t aggregates and from information auailable on the 
final uariables themselues (see the anex) . 
When analysis of all this information indicates 
the emergence of undesirable trends in the economy which, 
in the opinion of the authorities, haue to be corrected by 
a change in the degree of monetary control, the Banco de 
Espana makes signals by manipulating interest rates in an 
attempt to affect in the desired direction the spending 
decisions made by economic agents and. the formation of 
expectations. 
3.4 Short-term management of interest rates a n d  the 
criteria for moneta ry intervention 
In the implementation of this monetary policy 
outline, banking reserues haue lost their .character as a 
basic short-term reference, in line with the gradual 
change experienced in recent years. In fact, though during 
a first stage, essentially the second half of the 
seuenties, a relatiuely strict control of reserues was the 
rule (see Martinez Mendez, 1980) , during the eighties the 
tendency was towards a mixed strategy of rates and 
quantities. Consequently, the Banco de Espana has been 
accepting progressiuely more uariations in the ten-day 
targets set for reserues (see Chart S) . 
In contrast to greater uariation in quantities, 
uariability in interest rates has been falling. This 
process concluded, particularly since 1988, with the 
existing outline which is mainly based on ensuring in the 
short run reduced fluctuations in interest rates around 
the leuels set by the monetary authorities (see in this 
context, Chart 6 and EscriuA, 1989) . 
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Among possible interest rates strategies, the 
Banco de Espana has been moving towards implementation of 
a policy based on direct control of the interest rate in 
the money markets in the very short run, acting mainly to 
balance the overnight segments, while allowing the 
interest rates negotiated for longer periods to be 
influenced by market expectations. In operational terms, 
for the short-run implementation of monetary control, the 
Banco de Espana sets internally a band of maximum 
fluctuation, generally very narrow, for the interbank rate 
for overnight deposits. In this context, the range of 
reference for banking reserves, which is fixed from month 
to month, does not now play any role as a target or 
mechanism of reaction by the authorities. Its usefulness 
is relegated to an advance indicator of movements in ALP. 
In recent years, short-run control of interbank 
interest rates, fluctuating to a small extent around the 
level desired by the monetary authorities, has been 
maintained fairly strictly, despite the usual rigidity of 
the demand curve for reserves, changes of slope and 
unexpected movements in its position. In this context, if 
the supply of reserves were relatively inelastic and did 
not adjust flexibly to changes, interest rates would tend 
to behave erratically, as occurred frequently in Spain 
during the second half of the seventies. 
The Banco de Espana strategy in the last few 
years, on the other hand, has been based on maintaining a 
short-term supply of banking reserves generally perfectly 
elastic to an announced interest rate. The auction of 
monetary regulation loans has been the main instrument for 
this. At the same time, the Banco de Espana has used other 
instruments in order to maintain the fluctuation of the 
overnight rate within the reference band, avoiding an 
excessive degree of tension or easing in money markets. 
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These can be grouped into two categorie s :  use of the 
tradi tional i nstruments for credi t to financi al 
i nstitutions or open-market 
selling public securi ti e s, 
agreements. 
operations, that is 
i n  general with 
buying and 
repurchase 
The monetary authorities have be e n  lay i ng the 
foundati ons 
market to 
for i njections and cash drains on the 
become gradually the mai n instrument 
open 
for 
operations between the Banco de Espana and financial 
i nterme di aries. The creation and de v e lopment of the 
Book -entry Public Debt Market in the middle of 1987 was 
the main advance in this direction. The re ce nt reduction 
of the reserv e s  ratio to the le v e l  of 5%, in force since 
the third ten- day pe riod of March 1990, and the i ssue of 
Banco de Espana certificate s on the public debt market in 
re lati on to the v olume of fre e d  bank ing rese rv e s ,  
constitutes a new mov.e with i n  this strategy and tends to 
avoi d the rigidity of the tra ditional credit i nstruments 
avai lable for financial i nsti tutions (2 ) .  
The new condi tions in the fi nancial e nv ironme nt 
in which monetary policy operates, together with the need 
to harmoniz e some of the targets and the short-run 
stabi lity of the exchange rate, mak e a degree of 
di v e rsification adv isable i n  the instruments used for 
monetary control; some should be rese rv e d  for se nding 
definite me ssage s on the main lines of monetary poli cy , 
while others should be used as more v ersatile tools for 
managing li qui dity i n  the v ery short run and as a contrast 
to the reactions of the economic agents, prior to i ssuing 
firmer signals which can be di fficult to re v i se .  This has 
be e n  the strategy followed by the Banco de E spa na in 
recent y e ars, with the use of open-mar k e t  ope rations as 
the main i nstrument for daily regulation of money markets. 
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At the s ame time, changes in the marginal 
interest rate s et for the regular auction every ten day s 
of s hort-term Banco de Espana certificates hel d b y  the 
bank ing sy s tem (which replaced on 14th May l ast the 
auction of monetary regulation loans ) ,  as well as 
al terations in the l ev el 01' the cas h r es er v e  r atio (3) , 
are us ed only in those short-term s ituations when 
permanent changes in the degree of monetary control hav e 
to b e  made. Thus, the Banco de Es pana uses its main 
inter v ention r ates to s ignal clearly restrictive periods 
or periods of monetary easines s .  The changes in the 
inter v ention rate during the eighties , s hown in Chart 7, 
rev eal a tendency to greater s tability and a new frequency 
01' change. 
The devel opment and improvement of monetary 
control mechanisms and the management of the interv ention 
instruments, foll owing the outline described in preceding 
paragraphs , provides 
fundamental challenge 
the attainment of a 
the means 
faced b y  the 
high level 
to deal wi th the 
monetary authorities : 
01' efficiency in the 
working of the financial markets and guaranteed exchange 
rate stability , within a context in which the monetary 
actions b y  the B anco de Es pana are adequately trans mitted 
to the economic agents. 
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ANNEX 
SE LECTION STRATEGY FOR MONETARY TARGETS AND INDICATORS 
I n  the ou t line of monetary targets d escribed in 
the main text . the existence of a close a nd stable 
relationship between monet ary aggregates a nd final 
variables constitu t es the" essential criterion for 
selecting the indicators t o  be u sed a s  the basis for 
d ecision-making b y  the monetary a u t horities. Since the 
beg inning of thl1 seventies. the Ba nco de Espana has b een 
making su ccessive empirical tests of these relationships. 
which. g enerally. have been d ealt with in the framework of 
estimates of money d emand funct ions. 
The M3 d emand function. which had g ood resu lts 
u ntil the early eig hties. in terms of long-ru n  sta b ility 
a nd g ood ness of fit . ensu ring its u se a s  a n  int ermed iate 
target in monetary policy. started to d eteriora te 
sig nifica ntly in 1983 ( see Dolado.  1985 a nd 1987) . 
Accord ing ly. in 1984- . the Banco d e  Espana began to 
concentrate its attention on a wider monetary aggreg ate. 
ALP . 
the 
which 
pu b lic 
neu t ra lized in its d efinition the movement of 
towards 
liqu id. Chart 8 
assets other than 
shows the movement 
d eposits .  highly 
in the internal 
stru cture of ALP a nd this substitution process is clearly 
evid ent. 
The behaviou r of this a g g regate d u ring recent 
years has not been free from d istu rba nces of d ifferent 
kind s. which have had their orig in. t o  a larg e extent . in 
the strateg ies d esigned b y  the financial institutions to 
avoid Ba nco de Espana reg Ulations a nd t o  offer t heir 
customers tax-free a s  sets. although t here have been some 
g enuine financial innovations. Thoug h  the effect of these 
phenomena have erod ed . at cert ain times. the informative 
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capacity of ALP, its long-term relationship with the final 
v ariables has main tained acceptable levels of stability. 
Thus, prediction of the v elocity of circulation of the 
ag g reg ate, used in the years of monetary prog ramming ,  has 
reached a reasonably satisfactory degree of closeness t o  
the actual behaviour. 
The studies of t he· demand for ALP made in the 
eighties, t houg h they detect specific short-run 
instabilities in the estimated equations, 
stable long-t erm elasticity,  resistant 
show some v ery 
to chang es in 
specification and producing v alues for the parameters easy 
to j ustify by economic theory. A particularly attractive 
feature of the results of t hese equation is the ease with 
which long -run homogeneity is accepted among the nominal 
ALP balances and t he price leveL without ·any apparent 
eropsion . of the stability of this relationship over the 
last few years. Similarly a unit elasticity in the long 
run between ALP and real income is observed. The 
specification of these equations is completed by using an 
own interest rate to measure the increasing sensitivity of 
the aggregate to chang es in the return on the assets 
contained in its definition, and an alternative interest 
rate and inflation rate as opportunity cost v ariables. 
These t hree v ariables have an appreciable effect on the 
solution of the estimated equation s in both short and long 
run. The response functions deduced from the dynamic 
presen ted by these equations g enerally extends 
considerably over t ime, which is consist ent with the slow 
adj ustment processes of prices and q uantities in the g oods 
and labour markets and with the shock-absorber role of the 
more liquid financial assets in the disturbances affecting 
the decision -making process of the economic agents. 
Recently, since the t hird or fourth quarter of 
1 989, the ALP demand function has begun to show marked 
signs o f  i nsta b i li t y .  
d i si nt ermed i a t i o n  whi c h  
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The pro c ess 
followed the 
of fina nc i a l  
i mposi t i o n  of 
restri c t i ons on bank c redit has c aused a large i nc rease i n  
the v elo c i t y  o f  c i rc ulat i o n  o f  the a g g reg a t e .  As this 
d i sturbance i s  asso c i at ed wi t h  a t ransitory regulat i o n, i t  
es t o  be expec t ed that once the c red i t  rest ri c ti o ns a re 
lifted the stabili t y  of the ALP d emand func t i o n  will be 
restored . 
No netheless, t hese diff i c ulties have g i v en rise 
to new empiri c a l  studi es, still i n  prepa ra t i o n, onthe 
following two a spec t s :  f i rst, d emand functions for a n  
extend ed ALP have b een estimated, wi th the i nc lusio n  i n  
i t s  d efini t i o n  o f  balances o f  c ommerc ial paper i n  the 
ha nd s of the publi c ,  g ro wth of thi s finna c ia l  i nstrument 
has been very rapid since c red i t  restri c t i o ns were 
imposed . The results point to a recovery, although o nly 
partial, of the sta b i li t y  of d emand for this expand ed ALP. 
Sec o nd ,  the o pposite path has b een t aken, c o nstruc t i ng 
aggregates Whi ch, while maint a i ni ng wi thin the spectrum of 
wi d e  liquidity d efini ti o ns, a re more limi t ed i n  si z e  than 
ALP. 
The fi rst results obtained wi t h  more limi t ed 
d efini t i o ns of liquid i t y ,  exc lud i ng from ALP some of the 
compo nents . -for example, the outright purchases of 
Treasury bi lls or long er-term " repos" wi th public d ebt­
are promising and poi n t  t o  the possi bi li t y  of obtaini ng 
for these aggregates well d efi ned d emand func tions. 
Ho wever, t hey ha v e  had similar problems of st abili t y  since 
the tig htening of c red i t . 
F i nally, i n  line wi t h  Banco d e  Espana strategy to 
use the i nforma t i v e  capa c i ty offered b y  o ther monetary 
i nd i cators, there a re stud i es underway to ev a lua te 
exi sti ng relationships between final variables and narrow 
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monetary aggregates and credit aggregates, wich area 
already u n der close o b serv ation b y  the monetary 
au t horities. Although still prov isio nal, some resu lts can 
be advanced. 
The smaller aggregate than M3 hav e shown in 
recent years a relat iv ely stable relationship with nominal 
expen diture, resu lting from the lower sensitivity of its 
componen t s  to the int erest rates for finan cial assets 
exclu ded from its definitio n . As t he process o f  financial 
deregu lation and in n o v at io n  t akes place, and the taxation 
affecting finan cial assets stabilizes, it is pro bable that 
the informative content of t h e  smaller aggregates will 
impro v e. 
The M2 demand equations appear t o  show the best 
properties. Although the sho rt-run behavio u r  of this 
aggregate was subj ect to finan cial distu rbances of some 
size, the equ atio n s  have shown v ery stable behav iour for 
the last four years; long-run homogeneity between prices 
and money is accepted witho u t  difficu lty ;  long-run 
elasticity with respect to real income is greater than 
u n i  ty;  in the lo ng run solu tion o f  the model, an impo rtant 
part is played by the opport u nity cost v ariables, the 
inflation rate and return o n  the n earest substitutes to 
deman d and sav ings depo sits, while in the short run the 
most appreciable respo nse to demand are the changes in the 
int erest rate for those �ssets included in M2 ; t he 
respo nse functions deduced from the dy namic of the 
equ atio n s  
the case 
are 
o f  
appreciably 
ALP. This 
faster 
lat ter 
than those obtained in 
featu re is of special 
int erest in a cont ext in which sev eral indicators can be 
relev ant in the marking o f  decisio ns o n  monet ary policy. 
Con sequ ently, observation of the behav iour of M2 is v ery 
useful as it prov ides information co mplementary to that 
prov ided b y  ALP o n  the momen tum o f  the adj ustment 
processes os financial and real v ariables. 
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NOTAS 
( 1 )  A detai led description of the f i nancial assets inc luded in the 
definition of ALP i s  founded in Ariztegui and Perez ( 1 984) and 
with more recent information in Sanz ( 1988 ) .  
( 2 )  The Boletin Economico del Banco de Espana for May this year 
carries an extensive description of the change made in the 
implementation of monetary policy result ing from this reform . 
( 3 )  The Banco de Espana i s  'authorized to change the level of the cash 
reserve ratio up to a maximum level of 7X. 
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lIon.tart tal"Jleta in Spain 
(� Dee.-ber t/oee..ber t-l) 
Tar&et band 
113 
14 ,5 - 19 ,5 
15,5 - 19 ,5 
16 ,0 - 20,0 
14 ,5 - 18,5 
13 .5 - 17,5  
11.0 - 15 .0 
8 , 5  - 12 ,5 
A.L.P. 
14 ,0 - 18 ,0 
11,0 - 15,0 
11,5 - 14 , 5  
9 , 5  - 12 , 5  
6 , 5 - 9 , 5  
8 , 0  - 11,0 
6 , 5  - 9,5  
6 ,5 - 9 , 5  
( * )  Accumulated growth to September. 
Table 1 
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IN CENTRAL RESERVES (1) 
1881 ,.87 , ... n •• 
(1) Movement In r ••• rv •• In million of dollsr •. 
4000 
3000 
2000 
1000 
0 
-1000 
-2000 
11.0 
" "  
,. 
- 4 1 -
CHANGES IN THE DOMESTIC DEMAND AND GOP, 
AND THE GAP BETWEEN THEM (*) 
(Real growth) 
'2� _ Dom •• tlc 
demand 
1 0  - - � GDP 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• L-______ _L ________ L-______ _L ________ L-______ _L______ • 
18851 1186 1 1187 1 n • • .  , .  • •  1 ' 1 1 0 1  
CONTRIBUTION TO GOP GROWTH BY ITS COMPONENTS (*) 
, ... 
• 
I I 
3 3 
• h .. t---- • 
-3 -3 
_I L-______ � ______ _L ______ _L ______ _L ______ � ______ � _ . 
1985 1986 1987 
(e) Growth r.t •• for o�. quart., compar.d with 
•• me qua,ter of preceding y •• r. 
1988 1989 1990 
laI P .... <:::::.<:=< consumption • Print. 
consumption 
"
 
••
 
••
 
••
 
,.
 
•
 
19
78
 
19
79
 
19
80
 
IN
T
ER
ES
T
 R
A
 T
E 
FO
R
 IN
T
ER
V
EN
T
IO
N
 
BY
 T
H
E 
BA
N
C
O
 D
E 
ES
PA
Fl
A
 (0
) 
M
on
th
ly
 m
ea
n 
of
 d
al
ly
 d
at
a 
. ..
..
..
..
..
 ..
..
..
...
 "
 "
 ..
 ,,
, ..
..
 
19
81
 
19
82
 
19
83
 
19
84
 
198
5 
19
86
 
(e
) T
he
 m
ar
gl
na
ll
nt
.r
 ••
 t 
r.
t.
 o
f 
th
e 
dl
Uy
 l
uc
lo
n 
0
1 
m
on
at
ar
y 
re
gu
ll
tl
on
 10
ln
i 
w
 ..
 u
 ..
 d 
un
ti
l 
A
pr
il 
1.
a
O.
Sl
nc
l 
M
ay
, t
hl
 r
.t
. 
of
 In
t.
,.
.t
 u
u
d 
I.
 t
hl
t 
fo
r 
th
l 
I,
n·
da
y 
lu
ct
lo
n 
of
 B
an
co
 d
. 
El
p,
1I1
 c
lt
lf
le
at
 ••
. 
'"
''
''
''
''
 "
"
,,
"
'"
 
"
"
 ..
 "
 "
 , 
19
87
 
19
98
 
19
89
 
••
 
• •
 
••
 
,.
 
•
 
19
90
 
..
. 
N
 
.. • 
.. 
• 
11- • >-
..... III ct c a: '6 0 • IL U 
fit • .. W c. a: -
::;) 0 CJ .. 
iL • 
....I .Q 
ct E 
::;) • 
� u • () a ct c a 0 z • ct -
fit 
• .. 
� '0 W • CJ .!::! a: iii ct ,. � c c 
ct 
- 43 -
• .. o 
.. .. .. 
o 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
• 
.. 
.. 
• 
... 
.. 
• 
.. 
.. 
• 
.. 
.. 
• 
• 
• 
3 
• 
0 
-
44 -
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